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I.  Introduction 
• Per capita annual disposable income of urban 
households has increased from 343.4yuan in 1978 to 
21,809.8 yuan in 2011.  
• Personal income distribution has become increasingly 
unequal among individuals.   
• Income tax reform is on the agenda of the 
government  
 
• Mirrlees (1971) pioneered the optimal income tax 
theory, followed by Sadka (1976), Seade (1977), 
Tuomala’s (1984), Ebert (1992), Kanbur and Tuomala 
(1994), Diamond (1998), Dahan and Strawczynski 
(2000), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006), Mankiw, 
Weinzierl and Yagan(2009), Diamond and Saez 
(2011), Li, Lin and Zhang (2013), etc. 
• However, limited efforts have been made to use the 
optimal tax theory to design the optimal marginal 
income tax rates for a specific economy. 
• This paper focuses on the optimal personal income 
tax rates for China.   
• We estimate the function of China’s skill distribution 
based on a recent survey and develops a model of 
optimal marginal and average tax rates for China.   
• By assigning plausible values for parameters, we 
simulate the optimal marginal and average income tax 
rates for China.   
• We find that the actual marginal and average tax rates 
are significantly different from the optimal marginal 
and average tax rates. 
• Rigorous studies of China’s personal income taxation 
have emerged recently.   
• Zee and Hameed (2006) simulated the effects on 
different income groups of various reform plans of 
personal income, with the assumption that the wage 
in China has the Pareto distribution. 
• Piketty and Qian (2009) analyzed income inequality, 
tax progressivity and the level of tax revenue in China 
and India. 
• So far, there is no study directly addressing the issue 
of the optimal income tax rates for China. 
• The structure of the paper is as follows.  
• Section II discusses the evolvement of the personal 
income tax in China and estimate the skill distribution 
in China.  
• Section III develops a model of the optimal marginal 
tax rates for China. 
• Section IV finds the optimal marginal and average tax 
rates for China.  
• Section V presents some sensitivity analyses. 
• Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. Personal Income Tax Reforms in   
     China and China’s Skill Distribution 
• In 1911, the Qing Dynasty government drafted 
“Income Tax Prospectus,” which was the first attempt 
to levy income tax in China. 
• In 1914, the government announced “Income Tax 
Regulations,” but suspended the regulations in 1916. 
• In 1928 and 1929, the government revised “Income 
Tax Regulations (Draft)” and the implementation 
rules which were on hold for various reasons. 
• In 1936, the national government formerly 
established personal income tax system. The lowest 
marginal tax rate was 0.5% and the highest 20%. 
 
• In 1950, the government started to collect income 
taxes. However, the wage income tax was not levied, 
and the deposit interest income tax was eliminated in 
1959. 
• On September 1, 1980, the government announced 
“Personal Income Tax Law of the People's Republic 
of China”. The income threshold was set at 800 yuan 
per month. The lowest marginal tax rate was 5% and 
the highest 45%. 
• Table 1 shows the income tax rates adopted in 
January 1, 1994.  It was a progressive system of nine 
different marginal tax rates.The lowest marginal tax 
rate is 5%, and the highest 45%.  The tax threshold 
was 800 yuan per monthly. 
 
 
Table 1. Personal income tax rates (1994) 
 
Tax brackets for taxable income per month 
(yuan) Marginal tax rate (%) 
Over But not over 
0 500 5 
500 2,000 10 
2,000 5,000 15 
5,000 20,000 20 
20,000 40,000 25 
40,000 60,000 30 
60,000 80,000 35 
80,000 100,000 40 
100,000 45 
Source: National People's Congress of China (1994),Personal Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of 
China. http://www.lawxp.com/Statute/s1004363.html. 
• From January 1, 2006, the government raised the 
income threshold to 1600 yuan.  
• From March 1, 2008, the income threshold was raised 
to 2000 yuan. 
• In 2011, the income threshold was raised to 3500 
yuan and marginal tax rates were reduced from nine 
to seven levels, with the lowest marginal tax rate 
being 3% and the highest being 45%. 
• Table 2 shows the personal income tax rates based on 
the 2011 regulation. 
Table 2. Personal income tax rates (2011) 
 
Tax brackets for taxable income per month    
(yuan) Marginal tax rate (%) 
Over But not over 
0 1,500 3 
1,500 4,500 10 
4,500 9,000 20 
9,000 35,000 25 
35,000 55,000 30 
55,000 80,000 35 
80,000 45 
Sources: National People's Congress of China (2011),Personal Income Tax Law of the People's Republic 
of China.http://www.lawxp.com/Statute/s1059645.html. 
• It can be seen that the reform in 2011 reduced the 
low-income and middle-income group’s burden. 
• Many taxpayers do not need to pay personal income 
tax again after increasing the threshold from 2000 
yuan to 3500 yuan.   
• In addition, the reform made the tax system more 
progressive, with marginal tax rate being 45% tax rate 
for the group with income higher than 80,000 yuan 
per month, instead of 100,000 yuan in the 1994 tax 
regulation. 
Figure 1. China's marginal and average tax rates in 1994 and 2011 
 
• To analyze the optimal marginal income tax rate 
schedule for China, we must first estimate the 
distribution function of skills in China.   
• The data are from China Family Panel Studies 
(CFPS) 2009, carried out by the Institute of Social 
Science Survey of Peking University. 
• First, we omit the observations for those who have no 
work and whose hourly wage less than 2 yuan (about 
US$0.3) because they are too low to be reliable. 
 
• Second, we compute relative hourly wage income by 
dividing hourly wage income by the average hourly 
wage income, and use the relative hourly wage 
income to represent one’s skill level n. 
• Third, we calculate the proportion of the individuals, 
whose skills are lower than n, and the proportion is 
the cumulative distribution function (CDF), or the 
distribution function F with respect to the skill level 
n, and calculate the probability density function is 
denoted by f.  Figure 2a shows the distribution of F 
with respect to n. 
 
• Forth, find ln(n) and ln(1-F). 
• The approximate distribution function F of n: 
 
 
• The probability density function of the skill levels for 
China: 
 
 
• The density function is illustrated in Figure 2b.  
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Figure 2. The distribution of skills (labor skill levels) in China 
 
                     a. F(n) vs. n                                       b. f(n) vs. n 
 
 
III. The Model of the Optimal Income  
       Taxation for China 
 
 
• We now develop a model of optimal income tax 
introduced by Mirrlees (1971) and extended by 
Diamond (1998), with China’s skill distribution. 
• The optimal marginal income tax rate is: 
 
 
• where c and l satisfy equations (8) and (11). 
•                                                                          (8) 
•                                                                          (11) 
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• According to Li, Lin and Zhang (2013), with the 
utility function,                              ,used by Diamond 
(1998), for some        , and      , and the density 
function of skills,                    , with,                 ,       ,                    
          ,                , the optimal marginal tax rates are 
increasing on           . 
• Using the equations (5) and (11), we can get 
 
                                                                              (12) 
 
 
 
 
 
)1(),( klclcu −+= α
0>α 1>k
aa nabnf += 1/)( ∞<≤ nn 0>a
0>b ∞<< n0
),[ ∞n
∫ 





−





+=
−
n
n u
c
c
l
ll dttfG
unfn
u
u
lu
T
T )(
)(
1
'1
' λ
λ
• If                             , then        ,              ,                     . 
Equation (12) can be written as  
                                                                                (13) 
   
• Let                                       with               , we have 
 
 
                                                                                (14) 
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• Since           is strictly increasing as n increases, we 
have the following inequality: 
                                                                                (15) 
   
• Substituting equation (15) into equation (14) 
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• Since           and        , we have                                    
and          . 
• Under this condition, the optimal marginal tax rates 
are increasing on          .  In order to compute 
asymptotic marginal tax rates, we write equation (13) 
as 
 
• Since the skill density function is                , then          
                  . 
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• As           ,                        ,                     . By the 
L'Hospital Rule, we have: 
 
 
• So we have 
                                                                                    
                                                                                   (16) 
• We now know the optimal marginal tax rates are 
increasing on           and asymptotic marginal tax 
rates.        
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• From equations (8) and (11), we can get the system of 
differential equations for leisure and consumption: 
 
 
 
• We now ready to compute and for every n. 
• First, based on a given , we can obtain a value      . 
• Second, based on these results and assumed       , we 
can know      and      for every n, using a Runge-Kutta 
method to solve the system of differential equations. 
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• Third, a trial-and-error method is used to compute the 
value        given the value of E/Y，and then restart 
the second step. 
• Using the above results, we can obtain the schedules 
of the optimal marginal income tax rate and optimal 
average income tax rate . 
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IV. Optimal Marginal and Average  
      Income Tax Rates for China  
 
 
IV.1.Values of k and 
• When and E/Y=0.05, the optimal working time will 
be very different due to the value of k and as showed 
in Table 4. 
• When k is fixed, the value of is smaller, persons tend 
to work more.  When is fixed, the value of k is larger, 
persons with low level of skill tend to work more. 
• According to the actual situation in China, k=3 and 
k=5 are both not realistic. Here we just set k=4 and      
       =5.  
α
α
Table 4. Working time l with different skill n 
 
c(n) l(n) Asymptotic marginal 
tax rates 
Working time with different skill n 
F(n)=0.1 F(n)=0.3 F(n)=0.5 F(n)=0.7 F(n)=0.9 F(n)=0.99 
3 4 0.1317 0.1884 0.03463 45.78 0.194 0.208 0.227 0.260 0.342 0.646 
3 5 0.0986 0.1685 0.02555 30.27 0.174 0.188 0.208 0.241 0.328 0.653 
3 6 0.0711 0.1539 0.02209 15.88 0.159 0.173 0.192 0.225 0.316 0.654 
4 4 0.1958 0.2986 0.03339 51.66 0.304 0.316 0.334 0.362 0.429 0.654 
4 5 0.1563 0.2772 0.02509 35.07 0.283 0.297 0.316 0.347 0.423 0.668 
4 6 0.1213 0.2609 0.02192 18.95 0.267 0.281 0.301 0.334 0.416 0.676 
5 4 0.2476 0.3820 0.03249 56.15 0.386 0.397 0.411 0.435 0.491 0.672 
5 5 0.2035 0.3613 0.02475 38.99 0.367 0.379 0.396 0.424 0.489 0.688 
5 6 0.1628 0.3452 0.02180 21.61 0.351 0.364 0.383 0.414 0.486 0.699 
(    =0.02 and E/Y=0.05)  β
k α λ
IV.2. Value of  
•      represents a degree of inequality aversion, and it 
has a tremendous impact on tax rates. 
• Since                            , if    =0, then                         , 
which means marginal social utility will equal zero.  
If    =1, then                       , which means marginal 
social utility will equal one. 
• From Table 5 and Table 6, we can conclude that the 
value of influences not only the marginal and average 
tax rates, but also the taxable threshold. 
β
β
β
)1(
1
klc
u
u e
eG
−+
− +=+=
α
ββ 0lim =+= −
∞→
u
uu
eG β
β 1lim =+= −
∞→
u
uu
eG β
Table 5. The average tax rate 
 
Average tax rate (%) at the point n where 
 
 
 
Average tax 
rate = 0 at 
n* F(n)=0.1 F(n)=0.3 F(n)=0.5 F(n)=0.7 F(n)=0.9 F(n)=0.99 
0.01 -44.82 -35.69 -25.05 -11.52 10.93 38.76 0.8216 
0.02 -29.52 -23.40 -16.27 -7.15 8.58 29.25 0.8113 
0.03 -20.69 -16.35 -11.25 -4.63 7.22 23.53 0.7993 
(k=4,      =5and E/Y=0.05)  α
β
*)(nF
Table 6. The marginal tax rate 
 
Marginal tax rate (%) at the point n where 
F(n)=0.1 F(n)=0.3 F(n)=0.5 F(n)=0.7 F(n)=0.9 F(n)=0.99 
0.01 1.49 5.08 10.02 17.47 31.84 46.53 
0.02      0.97 3.36 6.77 12.19 23.45 34.80 
0.03      0.72 2.52 5.14 9.41 18.64 27.81 
(k=4,      =5and E/Y=0.05)  α
β
IV.3. Government Expenditure, E/Y 
•  E/Y is the ratio of government expenditures from 
personal income tax E to gross wage income Y. 
• From Table 7, we can see that E/Y will influence 
minimum consumption,     , i.e.,       will be smaller 
when E/Y is higher. 
• Government expenditure E/Y influences the threshold 
of taxation, i.e., the percentage of people to pay 
income tax.  
 
)(nc )(nc
Table 7. The income tax rate and budget target 
E/Y 
(%) 
   
Average tax 
rate = 0 at 
n* 
Average tax 
rate 
(%) when  
 
Marginal 
tax rate 
(%) when 
  
10 0.1349 0.2772 0.7158 29.93 35.19 
5 0.1563 0.2772 0.8113 29.25 34.80 
0 0.1777 0.2772 0.8543 28.58 34.41 
-5 0.1991 0.2772 0.8800 27.90 34.02 
(k=4,      =5and E/Y=0.05)  α
)(nc )(nl
*)(nF
99.0*)( =nF 99.0*)( =nF
• Now given the values of k,    ,     and E/Y, we can 
obtain the optimal tax schedules for the marginal tax 
rate and the average tax rate.   
• From Table 8 and Figure 3, we know that the optimal 
marginal tax rate always is positive; the optimal 
average tax rate is negative at low income levels and 
becomes positive at income levels 4012 yuan; both 
the optimal marginal and average tax rates for China 
are increasing as income increases, but increases at 
decreasing rates, and becomes rather flat at high skills. 
 
 
 
βα
Table 8. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.2432 0.2757 0.3249 0.5709 8.37 -13.36 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4256 0.4358 0.3663 0.7782 15.43 -2.40 0.00 0.00 
4012 0.4879 0.4880 0.3771 0.8113 17.14 0.00 3.00 0.38 
5000 0.6080 0.5858 0.3951 0.8545 19.82 3.66 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.9728 0.8677 0.4369 0.9164 25.06 10.80 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.5200 1.2653 0.4817 0.9505 29.14 16.75 20.00 9.96 
38500 4.6817 3.3884 0.6259 0.9864 34.45 27.62 25.00 20.12 
58500 7.1137 4.9754 0.6936 0.9916 34.92 30.06 30.00 23.50 
83500 10.1538 6.9518 0.7578 0.9944 35.03 31.54 35.00 26.94 
90000 10.9442 7.4653 0.7722 0.9948 35.04 31.79 45.00 28.24 
)05.0/,02.0,5,4( ==== YEk βα
Figure 3. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
 )05.0/,02.0,5,4( ==== YEk βα
• We can draw the following conclusions on the 
optimal income tax rates for China.   
• First, the optimal average tax rate is negative for low-
income groups, i.e., the government should subsidize 
the poor, although the marginal tax rates are 
nonnegative. 
• Second, the optimal tax exemption level is around 
4012 yuan, however, the actual income tax exemption 
level 3,500 yuan, which is lower than the optimal. 
 
 
 
• Third, the actual marginal tax rate and average rise 
too slowly as income increases, i.e., the actual 
marginal tax rate and average tax rate are too low for 
income groups between 4,012 to 58,500 yuan. 
• Fourth, the actual marginal tax rate seems to coincide 
with optimal marginal tax rates for income groups 
with monthly income between 58,500 to 83,500yuan, 
but the actual average tax rates seems smaller than the 
optimal average tax rates. 
• Fifth, the actual marginal and average tax ratesrise 
too rapidly at high levels of income, i.e., the actual 
marginal tax rate is too high for income groups above 
83,500. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Sensitivity Analyses 
 
 
 
• We conduct some sensitivity analyses by varying 
parameters             and       . 
• Case 1.          and  
• From Table 9 and Figure 4, it can be seen that the 
optimal threshold is much lower than the baseline 
case where k = 4.  For example, the average tax rate is 
zero when income is 3294, lower than 4012 yuan 
with k = 4. 
• Also, the optimal marginal tax rate is lower than the 
baseline case with k = 4. 
βα ,,k YE /
3=k 5=k
Table 9. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.2432 0.2613 0.2452 0.7187 9.03 -7.43 0.00 0.00 
3294 0.4005 0.4005 0.2846 0.8336 13.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4256 0.4221 0.2898 0.8440 14.20 0.82 0.00 0.00 
5000 0.6080 0.5754 0.3221 0.8929 17.55 5.37 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.9728 0.8678 0.3703 0.9348 21.72 10.79 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.5200 1.2860 0.4234 0.9592 25.08 15.40 20.00 9.96 
38500 4.6817 3.5541 0.6033 0.9872 29.66 24.08 25.00 20.12 
58500 7.1137 5.2582 0.6921 0.9916 30.09 26.08 30.00 23.50 
83500 10.1538 7.3817 0.7789 0.9941 30.19 27.30 35.00 26.94 
90000 10.9442 7.9334 0.7986 0.9945 30.19 27.51 45.00 28.24 
)05.0/,02.0,5,3( ==== YEk βα
Figure 4. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
 )05.0/,02.0,5,3( ==== YEk βα
• Case 1.          and  
• From Table 10 and Figure 5, it can be seen that the 
optimal threshold is much higher than the baseline 
case where k = 4.  For example, the average tax rate is 
zero when income is 4571, higher than 4012 yuan 
with k = 4. 
• Also, the optimal marginal tax rate is higher than the 
baseline case with k = 4.  For example, the marginal 
tax rate is 27.71% when income is 8,000 yuan, higher 
than 25.06% with k = 4.  
3=k 5=k
Table 10. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.2432 0.2893 0.3900 0.4356 7.27 -18.96 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4256 0.4495 0.4274 0.7204 16.21 -5.61 0.00 0.00 
4571 0.5558 0.5558 0.4464 0.8001 20.24 0.00 3.00 0.70 
5000 0.6080 0.5971 0.4530 0.8214 21.54 1.79 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.9728 0.8709 0.4896 0.9009 27.71 10.48 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.5200 1.2522 0.5282 0.9432 32.37 17.62 20.00 9.96 
38500 4.6817 3.2590 0.6495 0.9857 38.30 30.39 25.00 20.12 
58500 7.1137 4.7516 0.7049 0.9914 38.83 33.21 30.00 23.50 
83500 10.1538 6.6089 0.7566 0.9944 38.95 34.91 35.00 26.94 
90000 10.9442 7.0914 0.7680 0.9949 38.96 35.20 45.00 28.24 
)05.0/,02.0,5,5( ==== YEk βα
Figure 5. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
 )05.0/,02.0,5,5( ==== YEk βα
• Case 2.          and  
• From Table 11 and Figure 6, it can be seen that the 
optimal threshold is higher than the baseline case 
where      = 5.  For example, the average tax rate is 
zero when income is 4257, higher than 4012 yuan 
with      = 5. 
• Also, the optimal marginal tax rate is higher than the 
baseline case with     = 5.  For example, the marginal 
tax rate is 37.78% when income is 8,000 yuan, much 
higher than 25.06% with     = 5.  
4=α 6=α
α
α
α
α
Table 11. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.3031 0.3386 0.5434 0.3031 13.50 -24.63 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4498 0.3765 0.7689 0.4498 24.47 -5.68 0.00 0.00 
4257 0.5176 0.3907 0.8179 0.5176 27.99 0.00 3.00 0.53 
5000 0.5814 0.4028 0.8503 0.5814 30.72 4.37 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.8198 0.4410 0.9153 0.8198 37.78 15.73 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.1441 0.4822 0.9504 1.1441 43.08 24.73 20.00 9.96 
38500 2.7861 0.6173 0.9867 2.7861 50.38 40.49 25.00 20.12 
58500 3.9800 0.6823 0.9918 3.9800 51.26 44.05 30.00 23.50 
83500 5.4563 0.7446 0.9945 5.4563 51.55 46.26 35.00 26.94 
90000 5.8391 0.7586 0.9949 5.8391 51.58 46.65 45.00 28.24 
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Figure 6. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
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• Case 2.          and  
• From Table 12 and Figure 7, it can be seen that the 
optimal threshold is lower than the baseline case 
where     = 5.  For example, the average tax rate is 
zero when income is 3050, lower than 4012 yuan 
with     = 5. 
• Also, the optimal marginal tax rate is much lower 
than the baseline case with     = 5.  For example, the 
marginal tax rate is 13.32% when income is 8,000 
yuan, much lower than 25.06% with    = 5.  
4=α 6=α
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Table 12. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.2432 0.2504 0.3139 0.5925 4.19 -2.96 0.00 0.00 
3050 0.3709 0.3709 0.3463 0.7494 6.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4256 0.4216 0.3575 0.7861 7.85 0.95 0.00 0.00 
5000 0.6080 0.5872 0.3883 0.8583 10.28 3.41 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.9728 0.9085 0.4329 0.9176 13.32 6.61 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.5200 1.3754 0.4806 0.9507 15.74 9.51 20.00 9.96 
38500 4.6817 3.9724 0.6310 0.9863 18.71 15.15 25.00 20.12 
58500 7.1137 5.9464 0.7002 0.9914 18.90 16.41 30.00 23.50 
83500 10.1538 8.4113 0.7653 0.9943 18.93 17.16 35.00 26.94 
90000 10.9442 9.0521 0.7798 0.9947 18.93 17.29 45.00 28.24 
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Figure 7. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
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• Case 3.              and  
• From Table 13 and Figure 8, it can be seen that the 
optimal threshold is higher than the baseline case 
where            .  For example, the average tax rate is 
zero when income is 4084, higher than 4012 yuan 
with            . 
• Also, the optimal marginal tax rate is much higher 
than the baseline case with            .  For example, the 
marginal tax rate is 34.35% when income is 8,000 
yuan, much higher than 25.06% with            .  
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Table 13. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.2432 0.2924 0.3211 0.5783 12.52 -20.24 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4256 0.4423 0.3588 0.7851 22.16 -3.92 0.00 0.00 
4084 0.4967 0.4967 0.3698 0.8216 24.68 0.00 3.00 0.43 
5000 0.6080 0.5787 0.3849 0.8602 27.82 4.82 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.9728 0.8288 0.4227 0.9205 34.35 14.80 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.5200 1.1729 0.4634 0.9533 39.32 22.84 20.00 9.96 
38500 4.6817 2.9444 0.5960 0.9874 46.08 37.11 25.00 20.12 
58500 7.1137 4.2444 0.6594 0.9922 46.84 40.33 30.00 23.50 
83500 10.1538 5.8562 0.7200 0.9948 47.07 42.33 35.00 26.94 
90000 10.9442 6.2744 0.7335 0.9952 47.09 42.67 45.00 28.24 
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Figure 8. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
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• Case 3.              and  
• From Table 14 and Figure 9, it can be seen that the 
optimal threshold is lower than the baseline case 
where            .  For example, the average tax rate is 
zero when income is 3863, lower than 4012 yuan 
with             . 
•  Also, the optimal marginal tax rate is much lower 
than the baseline case with            .  For example, the 
marginal tax rate is 19.80% when income is 8,000 
yuan, much lower than 25.06% with            .  
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Table 14. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.2432 0.2658 0.3267 0.5674 6.32 -9.26 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4256 0.4311 0.3700 0.7748 11.89 -1.29 0.00 0.00 
3863 0.4697 0.4698 0.3782 0.7993 12.88 0.00 3.00 0.28 
5000 0.6080 0.5883 0.4004 0.8516 15.45 3.23 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.9728 0.8881 0.4444 0.9143 19.80 8.71 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.5200 1.3165 0.4915 0.9490 23.21 13.39 20.00 9.96 
38500 4.6817 3.6477 0.6418 0.9859 27.54 22.09 25.00 20.12 
58500 7.1137 5.4048 0.7117 0.9912 27.87 24.02 30.00 23.50 
83500 10.1538 7.5964 0.7777 0.9941 27.93 25.19 35.00 26.94 
90000 10.9442 8.1660 0.7924 0.9946 27.93 25.39 45.00 28.24 
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Figure 9. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
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• Case 4.                   and  
• From Table 15 and Figure 10, it can be seen that the 
optimal threshold is higher than the baseline case 
where               .  For example, the average tax rate is 
zero when income is 4998, higher than 4012 yuan 
with                . 
• Also, the optimal marginal tax rate is lower than the 
baseline case with               .  For example, the 
marginal tax rate is 24.77% when income is 8,000 
yuan, slightly lower than 25.06% with                . 
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Table 15. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.2432 0.2971 0.3250 0.5707 8.25 -22.20 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4256 0.4575 0.3665 0.7780 15.22 -7.52 0.00 0.00 
4998 0.6077 0.6078 0.3954 0.8543 19.56 0.00 3.00 0.90 
5000 0.6080 0.6080 0.3954 0.8544 19.57 0.00 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.9728 0.8909 0.4374 0.9163 24.77 8.42 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.5200 1.2903 0.4823 0.9504 28.81 15.11 20.00 9.96 
38500 4.6817 3.4249 0.6268 0.9864 34.06 26.85 25.00 20.12 
58500 7.1137 5.0215 0.6947 0.9915 34.52 29.41 30.00 23.50 
83500 10.1538 7.0099 0.7590 0.9943 34.63 30.96 35.00 26.94 
90000 10.9442 7.5266 0.7733 0.9948 34.64 31.23 45.00 28.24 
)00.0/,02.0,5,4( ==== YEk βα
Figure 10. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
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• Case 4.                   and  
• From Table 16 and Figure 11, it can be seen that the 
optimal threshold is lower than the baseline case 
where               .  For example, the average tax rate is 
zero when income is 2835, much lower than 4012 
yuan with                . 
• Also, the optimal marginal tax rate is higher than the 
baseline case with               .  For example, the 
marginal tax rate is 25.36% when income is 8,000 
yuan, slightly higher than 25.06% with                . 
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Table 16. The optimal income tax rates 
 
Current 
monthly 
income 
(yuan) 
nl c l F( n) 
Optimal 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Optimal 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
Actual 
average 
tax rate 
(%) 
2000 0.2432 0.2542 0.3248 0.5711 8.49 -4.53 0.00 0.00 
2835 0.3448 0.3447 0.3500 0.7158 12.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3500 0.4256 0.4140 0.3660 0.7785 15.64 2.73 0.00 0.00 
5000 0.6080 0.5636 0.3948 0.8547 20.07 7.31 3.00 0.90 
8000 0.9728 0.8445 0.4365 0.9166 25.36 13.19 10.00 4.31 
12500 1.5200 1.2404 0.4812 0.9506 29.47 18.39 20.00 9.96 
38500 4.6817 3.3519 0.6250 0.9865 34.83 28.40 25.00 20.12 
58500 7.1137 4.9295 0.6926 0.9916 35.31 30.70 30.00 23.50 
83500 10.1538 6.8939 0.7567 0.9944 35.43 32.11 35.00 26.94 
90000 10.9442 7.4042 0.7710 0.9948 35.43 32.35 45.00 28.24 
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Figure 11. China’s optimal income tax rates vs.nl 
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• From Table 17, we can see that k and  have great 
influence on both the optimal tax threshold and the 
asymptotic marginal tax rate.      mainly influences 
the optimal asymptotic marginal tax rate, and has 
very limited influence on the optimal tax threshold.  
On the other hand, E/Y has little influence on the 
optimal asymptotic marginal tax rate, but has a great 
influence on the optimal tax threshold. 
• In general, the optimal tax threshold is less affected 
by other parameters. In all the circumstances, the 
marginal tax rate should increase quickly at low skill 
levels, and keep at a rather flat level at high skill 
levels. 
 
 
 
β
Table 17. The optimal taxable threshold and asymptotic 
marginal tax rate 
k 
Taxable  
threshold 
(yuan) 
Asymptotic 
marginal  
tax rate 
(%) 
4 5 0.02 0.05 0.1563 0.2772 4012 35.07 
3 5 0.02 0.05 0.0986 0.1685 3294 30.27 
5 5 0.02 0.05 0.2035 0.3613 4571 38.99 
4 4 0.02 0.05 0.1958 0.2986 4257 51.66 
4 6 0.02 0.05 0.1213 0.2609 3050 18.95 
4 5 0.01 0.05 0.1760 0.2772 4084 47.14 
4 5 0.03 0.05 0.1449 0.2772 3863 27.98 
4 5 0.02 0.00 0.1777 0.2772 4998 34.68 
4 5 0.02 0.10 0.1349 0.2772 2835 35.47 
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 VI. Conclusions 
 
 
 
• Our findings are as follows. 
• First, based on the optimal tax schedule, the low 
income groups should be subsidized. 
• Second, the optimal income tax threshold is around 
4,000 yuan, compared to current tax threshold of 
3500 yuan. 
• Third, the optimal highest marginal tax rate is around 
35%, compared to the current rate of 45%. 
 
 
 
 
• Fourth, the current marginal tax rate and average rise 
too slowly for income groups between 4,012 to 
58,500 yuan as income rises. 
• Fifth, the current marginal tax rate seems to coincide 
with optimal marginal tax rates for income groups for 
the income groups with income 58,500 to 83,500 
yuan, but the actual average tax rates is smaller than 
the optimal. 
• Sixth, the current marginal tax rate rises too rapidly at 
high levels of income, i.e., the current marginal tax 
rate is too high for income groups above 83,500. 
 
 
 
 
• Individuals’ preference and government behavior 
affect the optimal and average tax rates.   
• If people value leisure higher, then the optimal tax 
rate is lower at all levels of income.   
• If people do not suffer much from work, i.e., k is 
larger, then people tend to spend more time working, 
and the optimal tax rate will be higher.  
• If the government values the poor’s wellbeing higher 
than the rich, i.e., is small, then the optimal tax rates 
will be higher.  
• If the government spends a large proportion of the 
income tax revenue, i.e., E/Y is high, then the optimal 
threshold will be low and more people will pay taxes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Thank you！ 
